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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how differences in the bargaining power of husband and wife
affect the distribution of consumption expenditures in rural Bangladeshi households.  Two
alternative  measures of assets are used:  current assets and the value of assets  brought to
marriage.  Results show that both assets at marriage and current assets are strongly
determined by the human capital of husband and wife and the characteristics of their origin
families.  For both husband and wife, parents’ landholdings are a consistent determinant of
both assets at marriage and current assets.  Contrary to the unitary model, husband’s and
wife’s assets have different effects on the allocation of expenditures within the household. 
Wife’s assets have a positive and significant effect on the share of expenditures on
children’s clothing and education.  This result is robust to the choice of asset measure and
estimation procedure.  After endogeneity of assets is accounted for, husband’s current
assets have a positive and significant effect on the food expenditure share. Neglecting the
endogeneity of asset measures to individual and parental characteristics may lead to biased
estimates of the impact of men’s and women’s assets on expenditure shares.  v
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 Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) examine the effect of a policy that effectively transferred the
1
child allowance from men to women in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s.  They find that it increases the
share of expenditures on women’s clothing and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing. 
 Haddad and Hoddinott's (1994, [Hoddinott and Haddad] 1995) work on Côte d’Ivoire used the
2
difference in the educational attainment of the head and spouse, the proportion of landholdings and household
business capital operated by adult women, the ratio of the spouse to the male head’s education, and other
dummy variables related to wife’s schooling as instruments for the share of women’s income.  
1.  INTRODUCTION
A growing literature has attempted to test the validity of collective versus unitary
models of the household (see Strauss and Thomas 1995; Haddad, Hoddinott, and
Alderman 1997, for reviews).  The unitary model, sometimes called the "common
preferences" model, is based on the notion that either all household members share the
same preference function or that a single decisionmaker acts for the good of the entire
household.  In collective models, on the other hand, different decisionmakers within the
household have different preferences.  When these individual preferences are aggregated
up to the household level, the collective model predicts that the distribution of household
consumption among individuals—their share of the pie—reflects their bargaining power.
Attempts to measure the bargaining power of individuals within the household have
therefore been central to tests of collective models. Various studies have attempted to use
exogenous policy shifts that affect different individuals within the household (Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997 ), shares of income (Hoddinott and Haddad 1991 ), unearned
1               22
 Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990) use unearned income: Thomas (1990) tests the collective model
3
by examining the effects of unearned income of men and women on nutrient intakes, fertility and child
survival, and child anthropometrics, while Schultz analyzes the differential effects of men’s and women’s
unearned income on labor supply and fertility in Thailand.
 Quisumbing (1994) examines the intrahousehold distribution of land and education as a function of
4
father’s and mother’s education and inherited landholdings in the Philippines. 
 Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg  (1997) examine whether assets brought to marriage by
5
husband and wife have a differential impact on child health in Indonesia.
 Doss (1997) examines the effects of current assets on the distribution of expenditure among different
6
consumption categories in Ghana.
income (Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990 ), inherited assets (Quisumbing 1994 ), assets at
3         4
marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997 ), and current assets (Doss 1997 ).
5           6
None of these measures is perfect.  Labor income, which has often been included in
computations of income shares (e.g., Kennedy 1991), is clearly problematic because it
reflects time allocation and labor force participation decisions.  Several studies (e.g.,
Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990) use nonlabor income (also called unearned income or
nonwage income), either directly, or as an instrument for total income (Thomas 1993). 
Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) assume that nonearned income is independent of tastes
and labor market conditions, which may not be true if much of nonearned income is from
pensions, unemployment benefits, and earnings from assets accumulated over the life
cycle.  However, these concerns may be less critical in studies that focus on children (and
households early in the life cycle) and in those that rely on measures of wealth that are
typically inherited or given at the time of marriage (Strauss and Thomas 1995).3
 One of her sensitivity tests uses a specification with the percentage of land owned by women, but
7
landownership by women in Ghana may be endogenous to marriage.  In Western Ghana, Quisumbing et al.
(1998) show that women obtain strong individualized land rights, equivalent to private ownership, from their
husbands if they help in establishing cocoa fields.  Husbands “give” their wives land to circumvent traditional
inheritance practices among the matrilineal Akan.
 Admittedly, a potential heir could exert much power within his or her household, but the threat of
8
disinheritance does exist.
 See, for example, Rao’s (1997) analysis of wife-beating in South India, which uses a combination
9
of qualitative and econometric methods.
Current asset holdings, used by Doss (1997) in her study of Ghanaian households,
may also be affected by asset accumulation decisions made within marriage.   Depending
7
on provisions of marriage laws, assets acquired within marriage may be considered joint
property and will not be easily assignable to husband or wife.  The validity of inherited
assets as an indicator of bargaining power may be conditional upon the receipt of these
assets prior to marriage, unless bargaining power also depends on the expected value of
inheritance.   Inherited assets could also be correlated with individual unobservables, such
8
as previous investments in the individual during childhood (Strauss and Thomas 1995). 
Finally, assets brought to marriage, while exogenous to decisions made within marriage,
could be affected by assortative mating and marriage market selection (Foster 1996).  
Finding the appropriate indicator of bargaining power should be guided not only by
the need to find a variable that is exogenous to bargaining occurring within marriage, but
more importantly by the cultural relevance of these indicators.  Increasingly, economists
are turning to ethnographic evidence and qualitative methods used by sociologists and
anthropologists to guide the construction of appropriate measures of bargaining power.  
94
 In Bangladesh, for example, where related households (the bari) typically live around a common
10
yard, landownership and education of the head in origin households affect educational attainment of children
in partitioned households (Foster 1993).
 Each site was part of an impact evaluation of programs disseminating new agricultural technologies.
11
For more about the main study, see IFPRI-BIDS-INFS (1997, 1998).
Based on anthropological evidence from the rural Philippines, Quisumbing (1994) argues
that inherited landholdings are a valid measure of bargaining power, since land is usually
given as part of the marriage gift and major asset transfers occur at the time of marriage. 
Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) used ethnographic evidence and focus-group
discussions in Indonesia to identify areas where women bring substantial asset holdings to
marriage, and where they can claim these assets upon divorce.  Noting that if male or
female “income” is measured with error, estimated income effects will be biased,
Frankenberg and Thomas (1998) investigate the possible biases from reporting spouse’s
assets by interviewing husbands and wives separately and comparing their responses in the
Indonesian Family Life Survey.  However, assets controlled by the couple may not be the
only relevant variable.  In societies where the extended family is a key player in
intrahousehold allocation, such as those in South Asia, characteristics of the extended
family may affect intrahousehold allocation outcomes.   
10
This paper contributes to this debate by examining how differences in the bargaining
power of husband and wife affect the distribution of consumption expenditures in rural
Bangladeshi households.  We test two alternative measures of assets:  current assets and
the value of assets brought to marriage.  We use new survey data from a four-round
household survey in 47 villages in three sites in Bangladesh.   We constructed these
115
measures from a module on family background, marriage, and inheritance that we
designed based on a qualitative study conducted in parallel with the main household
survey (Naved 1997).  Recognizing that both current assets and assets brought to
marriage may be endogenous, we examine the extent to which characteristics of husbands
and wives, as well as their families of origin, affect assets brought to marriage.  We also
investigate whether current assets are determined by assets brought to marriage and
individual, household, and extended family characteristics.  We then use the information
on family background of both spouses as instruments for the asset measures and
investigate the robustness of these coefficients to various specifications of assets.
We find that both assets at marriage and current assets are strongly determined by
the human capital of husband and wife, and, more importantly, the characteristics of their
origin families.  Parent’s landholdings (for both husband and wife) are a consistent
determinant of both assets at marriage and current assets, suggesting that extended
families not only arrange marriages, but may also have substantial influence on outcomes
within the marriage.  We also find evidence for differential effects of husband’s and wife’s
assets on the allocation of expenditures within the household, after controlling for total
expenditure.  Wife’s assets have a positive and significant effect on the share of
expenditures on children’s clothing and education.  This result is robust to the choice of
asset measure and estimation procedure.  After endogeneity of current assets is accounted
for, husband’s current assets have a positive and significant effect on the food expenditure6
 It can be argued that in extremely patriarchal societies, where practically all household resources
12
are controlled by the husband, a unitary model of decisionmaking holds.  Moreover, preferences could be
shaped such that the wife has the same preferences as the husband, as a pragmatic way to achieve domestic
harmony.  Whether the unitary model is relevant in this situation, however, needs to be empirically verified.
share.  A more disaggregated analysis of the food category shows that this result is driven
by expenditures on cereals, the main source of dietary energy.
We begin with a brief outline of the theoretical framework underlying our empirical
strategy in Section 2.  We describe the data and associated data collection methodology in
Section 3, and present the regression results in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes.
2. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
THEORY
Suppose that we have an agricultural household with two individuals, h and w
(husband and wife, respectively).  Under the unitary model, all members of the household
share the same preferences (or all decisions are made by a dictator).   Household
12
members derive utility from the consumption of a vector of individual commodities x
(which includes goods and leisure), influenced by a vector of household characteristics ã,
some of which are unobservable.  The household's utility function is given by
U (x; ã ), (1)
which is maximized subject to an income constraint,7
 That is not to say that the identity of the income earner is unimportant in unitary models.  If the
13
price of leisure, (wage), of h and w differ, then changes to the wage of either is likely to have different demand
impacts for other goods, due to gender-specific cross price effects with wages. 
Y = y + y  + y  . (2) j    h    w
Total household income is composed of joint income y and individual income y  and j        h
y .  Since preferences are identical, and income is pooled, maximization leads to a series of w
demand functions for x, which are a function of prices p and total household income Y,
and household characteristics ã.
13
x = x (p,Y; ã) . (3) i    i
For a given set of prices and pooled income, resources are allocated to household
members according to their ability to translate those resources into goods from which the
household derives utility. 
In the collective model, on the other hand,  different decisionmakers may have
different preferences.  Moreover, there is no unique household welfare index to be
interpreted as a utility function, thereby allowing the index to be dependent on prices and
incomes as well as "tastes" (Chiappori 1992).  More formally, in the most general class of
collective models, the utility of each household member depends on their own and possibly
other members' consumption of a vector of goods x, which includes leisure and home8
 This exposition follows Thomas and Chen (1994) closely.
14
produced goods.   Suppose that there are two people in the household, h and w. 
14
Household welfare will be given by
Max ø [U  (x; ã), U  (x;ã)], (4) h      w
where ø is a Bergson-Samuelson type of utility function.  Each individual's consumption
depends on consumption of goods and leisure, and is influenced by observable and
unobservable household characteristics.  The household maximizes welfare given a budget
constraint (2), which assumes that income is composed of individual incomes and joint
income y.  The resulting demand functions are then a function of the vector of prices p, j
individual and joint incomes y, y , y , and household characteristics ã. j   h   w
x = x (p, y, y , y ; ã). (5) i    i    j   h   w
In this general model, no restrictions are imposed on the effects of individual incomes. 
This is in contrast to the unitary model, where the coefficients on y  and y  should be zero. h    w
Testing whether y  = y  = 0 is a test of income pooling, an empirical test of the unitary h    w
model.
Collective models fall into two categories: cooperative or noncooperative.  In the
cooperative approach, individuals have a choice of remaining single or of forming a9
 The distribution of gains within marriage is a common application of cooperative models.  However,
15
it is possible that individuals (particularly females) may not have a choice about getting married or forming
a household.  One can argue that, in many contexts, the decision to marry or form a new household may be
motivated by non-economic factors, such as society's views of individuals who do not marry. 
 Interestingly enough, whether a divorce threat is credible or not is certainly asymmetric in
16
Bangladeshi society.  A man can easily divorce his wife by saying “Talak” (divorce) three times.  While a
woman can also divorce her husband, such instances are rare.
household or other grouping.  They choose the latter option when the advantages
associated with being in a household outweigh those derived from being single.  The
15
existence of the household generates a surplus, which will be distributed among its
members; the rule governing this distribution is the central issue of the analysis.  The
noncooperative approach (Ulph 1988; Kanbur 1991; Carter and Katz 1997; Lundberg and
Pollak 1993) relies on the assumption that individuals cannot enter into binding and
enforceable contracts with each other.  Instead, an individual's actions are conditional on
the actions of others.  The conditionality of action implies that not all noncooperative
models are Pareto optimal.  However, work by McElroy suggests that this is not as
serious as it may seem because noncooperative solutions can serve as threat points in
cooperative models.  As McElroy (1990) notes, dissolution of the group is not a credible
threat in a cooperative bargaining model in the context of small daily decisions.
16
Two subclasses of cooperative models have emerged.  Models of the first category
suppose that household decisions are always efficient in the (usual) Pareto sense.  Nothing
is assumed a priori about the nature of the decision process; the distribution rule governing
intrahousehold allocation is estimated from the data rather than postulated a priori.  This
more general viewpoint is especially convenient for assessing the relative suitability of the10
 The Nash-bargained solution can also be reached through more complex negotiating procedures.
17
Under quite general conditions, Harsanyi and Selten (1987) show that a sequential bargaining process
converges to the Nash-bargained solution, if one exists.  The Nash-bargaining model is more restrictive than
the class of Pareto-efficient household models described by Chiappori (1992) and tested by Thomas and
Chen (1994) and Bourguignon et al. (1994).  If we assume only that household allocations are Pareto efficient,
but individuals have different preferences, household demands should be affected only by prices and
individual components of unearned income (Thomas 1990).  A test of the equality of unearned income effects
suffices to test the common preference model against a broad class of alternatives, but is not a specific test of
bargaining models. We will test less restrictive versions in subsequent work.
competing frameworks. The efficiency hypothesis in particular is sufficient to generate
strong testable restrictions on household behavior (Chiappori 1992).
Models of the second subclass impose more structure on the household by
representing household decisions as the outcome of some bargaining process.  Then the
division of the gains from marriage can be modeled as a function of the "fallback" or
"threat point" position of each member.  The vast majority of bargaining models rely on a
Nash solution (Nash 1953).
17
Since we are interested in the role of assets in determining bargaining power, the
Nash-bargaining model provides a convenient point of departure.  Consider two
individuals, h and w, who are not (yet) married to each other.  As individuals not
cooperating in any activities, their utility functions are
U (x , x , L )  and  U (x , x , L ), (6) h 0   h   h       w 0   w   w
0           0
respectively.  Here, x  is a good consumed by h (such as food, water, or health care), x  is h                            w
a good consumed by w, L  and L  are leisure, and x  is a public good consumed both when h    w        011
 Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) interpret the threat point as the utility
18
associated with divorce, while in noncooperative models, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the threat point
could correspond to a noncooperative outcome within marriage, such as reverting to traditional gender roles.
individuals cooperate and when they do not.  Let p be a vector of the prices of all goods,
w be the wage rates of h and w, and N  and N , their respective nonwage incomes.  h    w
Unearned incomes are used as arguments rather than total income because the former will
not be affected by labor supply decisions.  If h and w do not cooperate, their individual
utility functions are each maximized subject to their individual full income constraints.  We
can write their indirect utility functions as
V (p , p , w , N ; á )  and  V (p , p , w , N ; á ). (7) h 0   h   h   h   h       w 0   w   w   w   w
0               0
 The V 's are interpreted as "threat points," the utility obtained independent of
0
cooperation,  while the á's are referred to as extra-environmental parameters (EEPs).  In
18
the context of household formation, these EEPs affect the relative desirability of being
single and may include access to common property resources and divorce laws.  
Now suppose that these two individuals (or their extended families!) are considering
marriage.  Marriage would be beneficial if there are economies of scale associated with the
production of certain goods (household or nonhousehold), or there may be some goods
that can be produced and shared by couples but not by single individuals.  An example
would be children in cultures where single parenthood is not well accepted.  Denote utility12
functions when cooperating in a joint activity as U  and U , respectively, where U is h    w
defined over the household public good and individual consumption of goods and leisure.
Both individuals gain from marriage when U - V > 0, and j = h, w.  We assume that
j    j
the male and female agree to maximize a "Nash utility gain product function."  This takes
the form of M = (U  - V )(U  - V ). This is maximized subject to a joint full income h    h w    w
constraint, namely
p x  + p x  + p x  + w L  + w L  = (w  + w )T + N  + N . (8) 0 0    h h    w w    h h    w w    h    w     h    w
This yields demand functions (for, say, food, clothing, health care) of the following form:
x  = x (p, w, N , N ; á , á ); I = 0, h, w ; (9) i     i      h   w   h   w
L  = L (p, w, N , N ; á , á ); I = h, w. (10) i     i      h   w   h   w
In addition to prices of goods and leisure, these demand functions include the
extrahousehold environmental parameters, and individual nonwage incomes affect both the
threat points and the demand functions.  In this study, we focus on the role of assets of
husband and wife as measures of individual nonwage incomes.  Since extended families,
rather than the couple themselves, are involved in the choice of the spouse, we also test
whether characteristics of the extended family influence the assets that each spouse brings
to the marriage.  We discuss our asset measures in greater detail below.13
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To test our model and estimate a system of demand functions similar to equation (9)
above, we estimate the following expenditure function:
w = á + â CRnpcexp + â C(Rnpcexp)  + â  C Rnsize + â CRnA  + â CRnA   j    j    1j     2j     3j        4j h    5i w
2
+ Ó  ä Cdem  + Ó  È Cz  + e              
K-1       S
k=1  kj k    s = 1  sj s    j
where
w = the budget share of the jth good; j
Rnpcexp = the natural logarithm of total per capita expenditures, and 
(Rnpcexp) = its square;
2
Rnsize = the natural log of household size;
RnA  and RnA = the natural logs of assets owned by the husband and wife, h    w
respectively;
dem = the proportion of demographic group k in the household; and  k
z = a vector of dummy variables indicating household location and s
survey round;
e = the error term; and j
á, â , â , â , â , ä , and È  are parameters to be estimated.  We include the square of Rn j   1j   2j   3j   4j   kj     sj
per capita expenditure so that any observed differences in the effects of individual assets
would not be simply picking up nonlinearities in the Engel curve (Thomas and Chen
1994).  Controlling for levels of household income ( as proxied by per capita expenditure),14
if the unitary model holds, assets of husband and wife should have no effect on allocations,
so â  = â = 0. 4j    5j 
We discuss estimation issues such as variable definitions and endogeneity of
regressors below.
3. DATA
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS
We use new household survey data from 47 villages in three sites in Bangladesh,
each site chosen as part of an impact evaluation of programs disseminating new
agricultural technologies. Commercial vegetable technologies are being disseminated in
Saturia thana, Manikganj district, referred to below as “Saturia,” while polyculture fish
production technologies are being provided in two sites, Jessore Sadar thana, Jessore
district, referred to below as “Jessore,” and Gaffargaon thana, Mymensingh district and
Pakundia and Kishoreganj Sadar thanas, Kishoreganj district, referred to as
“Mymensingh” below, in combination with specific extension programs for disseminating
these technologies.
Agricultural technologies and extension programs at each site are unique, resulting
in three case studies that may be compared.  In two sites (Saturia and Jessore),
technologies are being introduced through NGO programs targeted exclusively to women,
who are provided training and credit.  At the third site (Mymensingh), project and15
Department of Fisheries extension agents provide training to relatively better-off
households and training with credit to relatively poorer households, directed at both men
and women, but men more often than women.  The primary distinction between the two
polyculture fish production sites, however, is that in Jessore, the NGO (Banchte Shekha)
has arranged long-term leases of ponds that are managed by groups of women (ranging in
number from five to twenty).  In Mymensingh, ponds are owned and managed by single
households or households that have shared ownership. 
In each of these three sites, selection of households for the survey was preceded by
a census of households in villages where NGOs had introduced the technology, and
comparable villages where the NGO was operating, but had not yet introduced the
technology.  In each site, three groups of households were selected:  adopting households
(members of the NGO under study), likely adopter households in the villages where the
technology was not yet introduced, and a cross-section of all other non-adopting
households representative of the general population in the villages under study. For
households in each of these groups, a four-round survey collected detailed information on
production and other income earning activities by individual family member, expenditures
on various food, health, and other items, food and nutrient intakes by individual family
member, time allocation patterns, and health and nutritional status by individual family
member.  In the second round, information on parental and sibling background was also
collected for both the husband and wife.16
Between the second and third survey rounds, a parallel study using qualitative
methods was also conducted in a pair of villages (one adopting, or "program" village, and
one non-adopting or "control" village) in each of the three sites to elicit group members'
views on the effects of the NGOs and the new technologies on incomes, education and
health of children, women's status and empowerment, among others (Naved 1997).  We
drew from the results of the qualitative study to formulate questionnaire modules on
premarriage assets, transfers at marriage, inheritance, and indicators of women's mobility
and empowerment.  We also used modules from the questionnaire on women's
empowerment implemented by Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley (1997) and the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Hygiene's Dhaka Urban Livelihoods Survey.  The survey
modules were then reviewed by Naved and pretested with one or both of us present prior
to fielding the last round of the survey. Although many of the questions asked were
sensitive, since these modules were fielded in the fourth round (one year after the first
round), both male and female enumerators had been able to establish rapport with their
respective (male and female) respondents.
VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We restrict the following analysis to the monogamous households where both
husband and wife are present and no change in household structure or marital status17
 This obviously does not address issues of household formation and dissolution (Foster and
19
Rosenzweig 1997), nor the possibility that intact couples are those where bargaining has been "successful."
We do not deal with the sample selection biases introduced by analyzing only intact couples.  While we
attempted to construct a similar set of variables for deceased, absent, or divorced spouses by recall, these
measures are less reliable than those collected for "intact" couples. 
 Total monthly expenditure per household is 3,577 taka.  With an average household size of 5.5,
20
expenditure per capita per month would be 650.29 taka, or 7,800 taka per capita per year (US $180 per
capita).  This is slightly lower than the average for the sample as a whole, which is $190 per capita per year.
happened during the four survey rounds (divorce, separation, death of a member, second
marriage).   Our sample of intact couples with complete assets information consists of
19
826 households, of which 29 percent are three-generation households. 
Means and Standard Deviations  
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations of the variables used in the
expenditure shares regressions.  In this low-income country, food expenditures account
for a high proportion of the budget, 68 percent in this sample.   We also have detailed
20
information on nonfood expenditures.  Among nonfood items, clothing and footwear
account for almost 7 percent, housing, 4 percent, and health expenditures, 3.5 percent. 
The low amounts spent on education reflect the gratuity of primary schooling in
Bangladesh.  
The disaggregation of clothing and footwear into men’s, women’s, and children’s
clothing makes it possible to analyze whether differences in bargaining power affect
commodities consumed by specific demographic groups.  The services category includes
payments for domestic servants, while “personal care” refers to personal items such as18
soap, shampoo, and the like.  The “celebration” category includes cash gifts, taxes (a
negligible percentage), and expenditures on family events such as weddings and feasts
(e.g., Ramadan and Eid, which were covered by the third survey round).  Since rent on
owner-occupied housing was not imputed, housing expenditures, which only capture
repairs and new construction, may be understated.
Measures of Current Assets  
In the first survey round, the head of household provided a detailed inventory of
land owned and operated.  Information about mode of acquisition and individual owner
was provided as well as an estimate of the plot's value.  The same type of information was
collected about animals, including poultry, sheep and goats, and cattle.  In addition, the
head of household provided an inventory of 30 types of durable goods and capital
equipment owned in the household.  The head of household also gave an estimate of the
assets' value and identified the owner.  
In the case where assets are owned jointly with some nonhousehold member, only
the share accruing to the household was included in our computations.  When ownership
was not assigned, the asset was considered household property, including when it was
specified as a "couple's property."  This inventory includes inheritances, purchases, gifts,
home production, and government or relief transfers.  All asset values are reported in 1996
taka.19
Appendix Tables 13 and 14 show the distribution of assets among husbands, wives,
other household members, and "joint-owners."  Apart from household durables, the most
frequently owned assets are jewelry (81 percent),  agricultural equipment (55 percent),
large trees (48 percent) and vehicles (42 percent).  Seventy percent of the wives own
jewelry and 15 percent own household durables.  Irrigation and agricultural equipment are
most often considered a joint asset. Between 72 percent and 88 percent of wives own
some poultry while less than 10 percent own some kind of cattle in Jessore and Saturia.
Reported asset values are summarized in Table 2.  Households in Mymensingh
appear wealthier than the residents of Jessore and Saturia, mainly due to larger
landholdings (174 decimals versus 90 in Saturia and 78 in Jessore, on average).  On
average, wives’ total wealth represents approximately 10 percent of the household's
wealth, with land the most unequally distributed asset (less than 5 percent of the
household’s land in all sites).  Wives in Mymensingh own the smallest share of all assets
(less than 1 percent of household land, 32 percent of animals, 10 percent of durables)
while Saturia women own the largest share of animals (43 percent) and durables (20
percent).  In Saturia, while the proportion of the value of household durables owned by
wives is the highest, husbands declare ownership of 52 percent of the total household
assets in contrast to the other two sites, where the bulk of the assets is reported as joint
property.
Measures of Assets Brought to Marriage  20
   This information was complimented with the data on inherited assets.  When inheritance happened
21
prior to the marriage, these assets were added to the premarriage assets if not reported in the corresponding
module.
 A bride will typically bring stores of grain and other food items with her when she moves to her in-
22
laws’ compound.
In the fourth survey round, respondents were asked to recall the assets they owned
before their wedding (land, cattle, “durables”—jewelry, clothes, and  household
utensils—for both husband and wife, and in addition, houses for men and food items for
women).   Both male and female respondents also provided information about their
21
premarital occupation and experience in farming, day-labor, or other business activities. 
In addition, they had to compare the wealth of their family and their future spouse's family
at the time of wedding (results not reported).
Table 3 reports the proportion of individuals who owned land, house, cattle,
durables, and food (for women) as well as the average value of these assets.  Cattle
accounts for the bulk of male premarital assets, especially in Saturia where over three-
fourths of the men owned some cattle before they got married.  Approximately one-fifth of
the men own a house when they get married, with a slightly larger proportion (25 percent)
in Saturia.  Durables are a frequent asset in Saturia.  Land is seldom owned before
marriage, reflecting the fact that most sons live on their parents' farm when they get
married and that most land inheritance occurs upon the death of a parent, which is usually
after the son’s marriage.
Female premarital assets are much less valuable than male.  They most often consist
of food (84, 69, and 62 percent in Saturia, Mymensingh, and Jessore) and durables.  
2221
 We administered the module on transfers at marriage only to wives, to avoid overloading the male
23
respondents' questionnaire.  The wife was asked about five categories of transfers:  to the bride, to the groom,
to the couple jointly, to the bride's family, and to the groom's family.  The practice of interviewing only the
wife about transfers at marriage is consistent with work by Rao (1993, 1998), who suggests that women often
have better recall of these transfers, since marriage is the most important event at which assets are transferred
to women.  (Men, on the other hand, may receive sizable transfers at the death of a parent.)
Even though the house was not included in the list of wives’ assets, the value of the house
in which the newlywed couple lived was attributed to her when it had been constructed by
her parents.  The gap between female and male premarital assets is largest in Mymensingh
(a 40-fold difference).
In addition, a specific module about transfers at marriage was administered to the
female respondents.  Asset categories for these modules were complemented by specific
questions about jewelry (nose pin) and cash (shelami) exchanges at the moment of the
wedding. These specific assets were suggested by the qualitative analysis.  The transfers to
the bride and groom were computed by summing up all transfers to each individual and
assigning to each individual half of the transfers reported "to the couple."
Data presented in Table 4 point to larger transfers to the bride at the time of
marriage, the largest average transfers (6,395 taka) occurring in Saturia. Since only the
wife was interviewed about these transfers, she might not have known about all transfers
from her family to her husband's family.   For earlier marriages, recall bias and asset
23
valuation might also lead to measurement errors.  For the present analysis, we included
those transfers that are comparable to the previous asset categories as well as cash22
 This definition is consistent with that of Bloch and Rao (1998), who define dowry as a groom-price,
24
a payment in cash and/or kind directly made from a bride’s family to a groom’s.   
 This phenomenon is also largely reported in India (see Rao 1993, Rao 1998, and Bloch and Rao
25
1998 for references).
(excluding transportation costs, food costs).   These data show a net asset transfer to the
24
wife's side, although the most recent weddings exhibit a net transfer to the groom. These
data are thus consistent with the shift to dowry reported in the qualitative survey,
25
although the shift occurs quite late in the 1980s, which might be attributed to
underreporting.  In no case are the transfers at marriage enough to compensate the wives
for the value of the cattle and house owned by their prospective husbands.  This is
consistent with the following hypothesis about the structure of marriage markets in
Bangladesh:  if decisions are mostly made by the parents of the bride and groom, transfers
at marriage represent only one outcome of the marriage bargaining between them.  The
two families  may negotiate the bargain based not only on transfers at marriage, but also
on the expectation of inheritance and bequests. 
A separate module about inheritance from both parents (land, cattle, and others)
was also asked from both respondents.  Results (not reported here) show that wives
seldom inherit land, which is consistent with (1) Islamic inheritance laws, whereby
daughters inherit half the share of sons (Subramanian 1998) and (2) widespread practice of
renouncing their share in favor of their brothers.  In our sample, when estate division
occurred, 30 percent of the female respondents reported that they or their sisters gave up
their share.  Monetary compensation is not always requested as women tend to see this as23
an insurance mechanism to maintain ties with their brothers, who would have to support
them in the event of divorce or widowhood.  Total land owned by the wife's parents is
significantly higher (t-test at 1 percent) than total land owned by the husband's parents in
our sample households, with a 0.49 correlation coefficient.  In view of the disparity
between husband's and wife's landownership, this is consistent with the idea that marriages
are the outcomes of a bargain between the parents.  Women did not report any other
inheritance except for some rare instances of inherited cattle.  Houses are the next valuable
asset in the husband's inheritance except in Jessore.  
The relatively small proportion of inheritance from mothers comes from the practice
of dividing each parent's estate at his or her own death: since the fathers are, on average,
10 years older than the mothers, most mothers are still alive and living with their sons
(either our sample household heads or a brother) on an estate that has not been divided.  It
is also possible that some of the mother's original assets were counted in assets jointly
owned by the household.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DETERMINANTS OF ASSET HOLDINGS
We first examine the determinants of assets at marriage and current assets of
husband and wife, respectively.  We use the total value of assets since wives do own some
assets, albeit lower in value than their husbands, but only rarely own land.  We present24
 t-statistics in bold indicate significance at 10 percent or better (two-tailed tests). The number of
26
observations in the regressions is less than 826 (our sample of intact couples) due to missing information on
parents and siblings from the second round interviews.
results both for OLS and median regressions since we observe very large and very small
values in our sample.
Determinants of Assets at Marriage
Table 5 presents regressions of husband’s assets at marriage as a function of his
own characteristics (education, age, age squared, birth order, number of siblings, and
number of living brothers), his parents’ characteristics (land and education), and his wife’s
characteristics (her parents’ land and her education), the year of marriage, and site
dummies.   The year of marriage is included to account for possible secular trends in
26
transfers at marriage, such as the earlier reported shift from bride-price to dowry. 
Husbands with education past primary schooling own more valuable assets.  Higher birth-
order children also seem to have more assets, reflecting parents’ ability to accumulate
assets over the course of their marriage, but this is offset by the number of siblings, who
are competitors for their parents’ wealth.  A wife with more than primary schooling seems
to be associated with a less valuable stock of assets at marriage for the husband
(significantly so in the median regression). While the husband’s own characteristics
significantly affect his stock of assets at marriage, so do his parents’ landholdings.  The
wife’s parents’ landholdings do not affect husband’s assets at marriage.25
 Wives have much lower educational attainment than husbands (67 percent have no formal schooling,
27
compared to 53 percent for husbands).  
For wives, parental landholdings have a positive and significant effect on the value
of the wife’s assets at marriage  (Table 6).  The total value of assets is also higher if her
father has some secondary education (significantly so in the OLS specification). 
Secondary education does not significantly increase the value of the wife’s assets.   The
27
number of siblings and the number of living brothers do not seem to affect her total value
of assets.  Wives whose husbands’ parents have larger landholdings, or whose husbands
have a university education, bring more valuable assets to marriage, respectively.  The
effect of in-laws’ landholdings thus appears to be asymmetric.  Husbands’ parents’
landholdings affects wife’s assets at marriage, but not vice versa.  This confirms that there
is selection and, indeed, bargaining, occurring in the marriage market, and that
characteristics of the parents matter just as much as those of the prospective spouses.  In
fact, the qualitative work suggests that the wife’s family has to meet the demands of the
husband’s family before the marriage can take place; nonfulfillment of these demands
could even be grounds for domestic violence and divorce.
Determinants of Current Assets  
Current assets are our other measure of bargaining power.  We include the value of
assets at marriage among the determinants of current assets to see whether spouses with a
larger stock of assets at marriage have a “head start” in asset accumulation.  We use26
similar regressions as in the two previous tables (OLS and median regressions).  Table 7
indicates that husbands’ assets at marriage are not a significant determinant of current
assets but parental landholdings continue to be positive and significant.  Typically, land
inheritance or the division of the parental estate occurs after marriage, at the parents’
death, so it is very likely that current assets may reflect the acquisition of inherited assets. 
The negative coefficient on year of marriage in the OLS regression may indicate that
couples who are married relatively recently may have had less time to accumulate assets in
a context where landholdings are becoming smaller after division between heirs; this
result, however, is opposite to the positive secular trend of assets at marriage.  The
landholdings of the wife’s parents are significant determinants of the value of the 
husband’s current assets only in the median regression.
Assets at marriage do not seem to give wives any special advantage either (Table 8). 
Her parents’ land continues to be positively related to her asset position (significantly so in
the OLS), suggesting that throughout her lifetime, her extended family remains a source of
support, financial or otherwise.  Brothers may also offer additional resources, since a
woman’s current asset holdings is positively affected by the number of living brothers. 
Marrying a better-educated man does have some advantages: women whose husbands
have some secondary or some university education have more current assets.
DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURE PATTERNS27
 While it could be argued that excluding one round from the estimation would not give an accurate
28
pattern of expenditures over a full year, according to the survey design, the first and the fourth rounds were
conducted at a year’s interval, so expenditure patterns in the fourth round are expected to be very similar to
that in the first round.
Given that parental characteristics significantly affect the assets brought to a
marriage by the couple, and that both parental and individual characteristics determine
current assets, estimating an expenditure share equation without accounting for potential
endogeneity of regressors would lead to biased estimates.  For example, current total
expenditure per capita, household size, and the husband’s and wife’s asset measures are
potentially endogenous. We thus employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure
using instruments suggested by the previous analysis.  For assets at marriage, we use the
regressors in Tables 5 and 6 as instruments (husband’s and wife’s education, age, age
squared, birth order, number of siblings, number of living brothers, husband’s and wife’s
families’ landholdings, and indicators of the educational attainment of their parents.)  For
current assets, we use two alternative instrument sets.  In the first set, we use assets at
marriage as an instrument; in the second, we acknowledge its endogeneity and use only
the set of instruments for assets at marriage.  Many of these instruments would also affect
total expenditure and household size; for additional instruments, we include the lagged
(first round) values of the Rn of per capita expenditure and its square, and Rn household
size.  We thus perform the regressions only on the second to fourth round data.
2828
 We also estimated OLS regressions with current assets and assets at marriage as regressors in
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alternative specifications, and 2SLS with current assets.  Selected coefficients are reported in Table 12.  We
will correct standard errors for clustering in the next revision. 
 Tests of the equality of husband’s and wife’s coefficients, and ratios of their estimated effects will
30
be done in future work.
We present the complete results for the 2SLS regressions with assets at marriage in
Table 9 and current assets in Table 10, instrumented using the same set of instruments.  
29
These results are highly preliminary and will be revised; many of the regressions, while
significant, have low R-squareds.  Our results reject the null hypothesis that a unitary
model of the household operates in rural Bangladesh.  Even in a patriarchal society where
husbands control most of the household’s resources, when household expenditure is
controlled for, coefficients on husband’s and wife’s assets in the majority of the
expenditure shares regressions are significantly different from zero.   
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A greater number of coefficients on men's and women's assets are significant in the
specification with current assets. Husband's assets at marriage are significant (and
negative) only in the fuel share regression.  In contrast, husband's current assets have a
positive and significant effect on the share of food expenditure, and negative and
significant effects on expenditure shares of men's clothing, women's clothing, services,
durables, and personal care (Table 10).  Women's assets at marriage (Table 9) have a
positive and significant effect on children's clothing and expenditure on education, and a
negative effect on services, health expenditures, and recreational expenditures.  Women's
current assets continue to be positively associated with expenditures on children's clothing
and education.  They also positively affect shares of expenditures on transportation, and29
 For example, in Bangladesh, Bouis and Novenario-Reese (1997) find that adult males are given
31
preference in the intrahousehold distribution of certain micronutrient dense foods, such as milk, eggs, and
meat, while other micronutrient dense foods, such as fish and vegetables, are more equitably distributed
among household members.
 Note that our dependent variables still use total expenditure, not food expenditure, as the
32
denominator.  For comparability, and to avoid making assumptions regarding the separability of the utility
function into food and nonfood groups, we decided to compute ratios of expenditures on each food subgroup
to total expenditure.
negatively affect shares of housing and fuel.  The results for children’s clothing and
education are consistent with most of the empirical evidence on the positive and significant
effect of women’s incomes on investments in children (e.g., Doss 1997; Thomas 1994;
Thomas and Chen 1994).  In societies where a woman’s ability to accumulate assets is
proscribed, children are probably her most important investment and insurance for the
future.
The positive and significant coefficient of husband's current assets in the food share
equation seems surprising at first glance, since other studies from Sub-Saharan Africa
(Doss 1997; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995) and Taiwan (Thomas and Chen 1994) show
that increasing the share of resources controlled by women is associated with an increased
food budget share.  To see whether men's and women's assets have a differential impact on
more disaggregated food categories, which could reflect differences in food consumption
patterns between men and women, we disaggregated food expenditures into three groups: 
animal products, plant products (excluding cereals), and cereals (Table 11).  
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We estimated expenditure share regressions for these three subgroups using the
same specifications in Tables 9 and 10.   The coefficient of husband's assets is not
3230
 In Taiwan, women's income share has a significant and positive effect on household budget shares
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of staples and a negative effect on budget shares allocated to alcohol and cigarettes (Thomas and Chen 1994).
 To verify this hypothesis, we intend to compare these results to other countries in South Asia where
34
norms regarding women's seclusion may prevent their extensive involvement in food purchases and
marketing. 
significant in any of the regressions in the specifications using assets at marriage, but is
positive and significant (albeit of small magnitude) in the cereals regression using current
assets.  The coefficient of wife's current assets is significant and negative in the cereals
regression. Neither men's nor women's assets significantly affect expenditures on animal
products and plant products (excluding cereals).  It is possible that preferences for the
allocation of such foods are the same for men and women, and thus they behave like a
unitary household.  The results also suggest that the results for the food group as a whole
are being driven mostly by the cereals subgroup. 
These results may also be affected by factors specific to the Bangladeshi situation. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa and Taiwan, where positive effects of women's resources on food
shares have been estimated, women are responsible for food crop production or have
independent sources of income, respectively.   In contrast, in Bangladesh, men control the
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production and marketing of rice, the major staple, and they also purchase most of the
food in the market. This might explain the divergence of the Bangladesh results from those
previously reported.   
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Finally, we compare alternative estimates of the effects of men’s and women’s
assets (Table 12).  Since both assets at marriage and current assets are endogenous,
ordinary least squares estimates are biased estimates of the impact of men’s and women’s31
assets.  In the case of expenditures on child clothing, the coefficient of women’s assets is
consistently positive and significant, but the magnitude of the effect increases from 0.04
for the OLS estimate on assets at marriage to 0.15 for the 2SLS estimate.  The effect is
even more striking for current assets: the coefficient increases from 0.04 to 0.27. 
Similarly, the magnitude of the coefficient of women’s assets at marriage in the education
equation increases from 0.17 to 0.34, and from 0.17 to 0.83 for current assets.  This
suggests that neglecting the endogeneity of asset measures may lead to biases in the
measurement of the impact of men’s and women’s bargaining power.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND NEXT STEPS
This paper aimed to test the unitary model of the household against an alternative
that postulates that individuals have different preferences and do not pool their resources. 
Our results, based on alternative measures of men’s and women’s assets, suggest that,
even in the patriarchal society of rural Bangladesh, a collective model is a better
description of household decisionmaking.
Our work takes the current literature on measures of bargaining power further by
explicitly modeling the determinants of the assets that each spouse brings to marriage, as
well as the determinants of current assets.  While individual characteristics are significant32
determinants of asset holdings, so are characteristics of the parents who negotiated the
marriage in the first place.  Neglecting the endogeneity of asset measures to individual and
parental characteristics may lead to a biased estimate of the coefficients on men’s and
women’s asset measures, though not necessarily a rejection of the collective model. 
However, our results also suggest that conventional bargaining models need to be
modified.  Even if the endogeneity of current assets is controlled for by using assets
brought to marriage, these are determined in the context of marriage markets.  In extended
family settings found in Bangladesh and many parts of the developing world, both
intrahousehold and intergenerational bargaining may be important.  Taking into account
the bargaining power of other members of the extended family (the mother-in-law, for
example) may be key to explaining intrahousehold allocation outcomes in societies with
complex household structures.
Finally, our work adds to the evidence that increased resources controlled by
women are often allocated towards children, in this case, through children’s clothing and
schooling.  Given that women in Bangladesh are disadvantaged with respect to both asset
ownership and education, it is possible that the greatest impact of interventions to increase
resources under their control will be felt by the next generation.  34
TABLES36
Table 1—Means and standard deviations
Mean deviation
Standard
Dependent variables (expenditure shares x 100)
   Food 68.20  15.37 
   Housing 4.10  11.26 
   Men's clothing and footwear 2.45  2.36 
   Women's clothing and footwear 2.96  2.74 
   Children's clothing and footwear 1.36  1.78 
   Services 0.46  2.10 
   Household durables 0.60  1.08 
   Health expenditures 3.50  6.12 
   Celebrations (gifts, taxes, family events) 2.35  7.96 
   Education 2.52  3.77 
   Personal care 2.40  1.88 
   Nondurable goods 0.80  0.73 
   Transportation 2.70  4.36 
   Recreation 0.12  0.50 
   Fuel 1.95  3.29 
   Cigarettes, betel nut 2.85  2.36 
Independent variables
   Ln per capita expenditure  6.37  0.53 
   Ln household size 1.62  0.41 
Household demographics
   Share females 20-65 0.26  0.10 
   Share males 10-19 0.13  0.15 
   Share females 10-19 0.11  0.13 
   Share males 6-9 0.05  0.10 
   Share females 6-9 0.04  0.09 
   Share males 0-5 0.06  0.11 
   Share females 0-5 0.06  0.11 
   Share males 65+ 0.02  0.06 
   Share females 65+ 0.02  0.05 
Share of households in sites
   Saturia 0.33  0.47 
   Jessore 0.33  0.47 
Asset measures (1996 taka)
   Pre-wedding assets
   Husband 81,929  145,584 
   Wife 7,064  8,472 
Transfers at marriage
   Husband 4,053  15,014 
   Wife 5,856  11,646 
Current assets
   Husband 165,427  212,271 
   Wife 4,825  19,134 
Source:  IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 Survey.37
Table 2—Current assets
Table 2a—Current landownership, by site
Site
Saturia (n=282) Mymensingh (n=290) Jessore (n=279)
Owner unit Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Land Standard Standard Standard
Husbands   Land owned  dec. 79  99  166  185  74  124 
  Value of land   Tk 130,142  160,406  223,236  247,646  109,602  179,143 
  Percent of household value 92% 96% 94%
Wives   Land owned dec. 3  21  1  14  2  8 
  Value of land  Tk 3,914  26,221  1,500  14,365  2,165  9,943 
  Percent of household value 3% 0% 4%
Household  Total land owned dec. 90  112  174  191  78  125 
  Total value of estate Tk 148,120  180,435  235,259  256,286  115,399  180,446 
Table 2b—Current livestock (includes poultry, sheep, goats, and cattle), by site
Site
Saturia        Mymensingh Jessore
Assets/individual Unit Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Standard Standard Standard
Household  Percentage owning  % 91% 92% 96%
  Total cattle value of  Tk 6,478  6,663  6,417  6,891  6,244  7,120 
For households who own some type of animals
    Percentage owning  % 46% 44% 25%
  Value of animals  Tk 4,475  6,062  4,575  6,778  2,525  5,347 
  Percent of household value 43% 40% 20%
 
  Wives   Percentage owning  % 79% 81% 91%
  Value of animals  Tk 1,294  3,273  447  1,246  1,477  2,395 
  Percent of household value 41% 32% 51%
Table 2c—Values of current durable goods and equipment, by site
Site
Saturia        Mymensingh Jessore
Owner Unit Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Standard Standard Standard
Husband   Value of goods Tk 5,163  (9,265) 4,740  (13,773) 3,086  (19,208)
  Percent of household value 52% 24% 20%
Wife   Value of goods Tk 1,260  (1,917) 1,307  (3,091) 793  (2,427)
  Percent of household value 20% 10% 13%
Household Tk 10,446  (15,414) 17,441  (29,200) 9,567  (24,968)
Source: IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 Survey.38
Table  3—Premarital physical assets, by site
Site
Saturia Mymensingh Jessore
Assets/Individual % Mean deviation % Mean deviation % Mean deviation
Value Standard Value Standard Value Standard
Husbands
   Land 12 24,631  207,530  13 25,478  106,924  8 9,540  56,038 
   House 25 2,290  6,078  19 2,552  7,533  19 2,134  6,002 
   Cattle 77 86,275  60,376  44 46,380  61,262  32 34,469  59,014 
   Durables 71 5,379  12,173  28 3,018  8,645  5 57  346 
   Food N.A. N.A. N.A.
Total 118,575  214,492  77,428  139,038  46,200  91,415 
Wives
   Land 2 1,267  12,430  0 213  3,629  1 138  1,575 
   House 3 307  2,682  0 9  147  1 181  2,012 
   Cattle 7 563  4,731  4 371  2,287  10 349  1,431 
   Durables 43 1,455  5,657  47 1,045  3,020  26 717  3,286 
   Food 84 569  1,341  69 316  648  62 137  239 
Total 4,161  16,688  1,955  5,420  1,521  4,385 
Source: IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 Survey.
Note: All values are in 1996 takas (US$1 ~ 44 Tk). N.A = not available.
Table 4—Assets transfers at wedding, as reported by wives, by site
Value received Site
Saturia Mymensingh Jessore
Recipient Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviatio
Standard Standard Standard
n
Groom 4,158 23,897 4,947 7,380 2,209 4,933
Bride 6,395 13,949 5,263 10,845 5,046 8,789
Groom's family 880 5,345 400 1,899 265 2,095
Bride's family 89 717 198 1,152 169 817
Couple 1,017 6,565 609 1,513 22 211
Sample size 282 272 272
Source: IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 Survey.39
Note: All values are in 1996 takas (US$1 ~ 44 Tk).40
Table 5—Determinants of husband's assets at marriage
                    Dependent variables in natural logarithms of (assets + 1)
Total value of husband's assets at marriage
OLS Median
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Husband's characteristics
   Primary education -0.248  -0.781  -0.334  -1.616 
   Secondary education 0.755  1.889  0.471  1.831 
   University education -0.448  -0.691  -0.038  -0.090 
   Age 0.315  2.787  0.186  2.531 
   Age squared -0.002  -2.223  -0.001  -2.070 
   Birth order 0.190  2.733  0.155  3.439 
   Number of siblings -0.134  -1.832  -0.087  -1.839 
   Number of living brothers -0.110  -0.982  -0.098  -1.350 
Husband's parents' characteristics
   ln(parents' land + 1) 0.228  3.438  0.253  5.834 
   Father has primary education -0.154  -0.461  0.049  0.226 
   Father has secondary education -0.112  -0.241  -0.199  -0.666 
   Mother illiterate -0.049  -0.085  -0.015  -0.040 
Wife's characteristics
   ln( parents' land + 1) 0.118  1.570  0.017  0.354 
   Primary education 0.142  0.413  0.496  2.224 
   Secondary education -0.543  -1.131  -0.810  -2.656 
   Age -0.125  -1.085  -0.058  -0.776 
   Age squared 0.001  0.828  0.001  1.027 
   Year of marriage 0.078  2.498  0.056  2.781 
Site dummies
   Saturia 0.752  2.425  1.796  8.908 
   Jessore -1.406  -4.575  -1.419  -7.108 
   Constant -152.750  -2.416  -107.414  -2.627 
Number of observations 721  721 
F 6.55 
p-value 0 
R-squared 0.1577  0.178 
Note: t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.41
Table 6—Determinants of wife's assets at marriage
                   Dependent variables in natural logarithms of (assets+1)
Total value of wife's assets at marriage
OLS Median
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Wife's characteristics
   Primary education 0.208  1.458  0.264  1.654 
   Secondary education 0.190  0.850  0.186  0.947 
   Age 0.062  1.322  0.286  5.184 
   Age squared -0.004  -6.097  -0.001  -1.767 
   Birth order 0.004  0.147  0.015  0.566 
   Number of siblings -0.035  -1.126  -0.025  -0.879 
   Number of living brothers -0.012  -0.258  0.000  0.002 
Wife's parents' characteristics
   ln(parents' land + 1) 0.086  2.467  0.123  3.971 
   Father has primary education 0.001  0.009  -0.017  -0.119 
   Father has secondary education 0.225  1.300  0.321  1.653 
   Mother has primary education 0.072  0.351  -0.025  -0.135 
   Mother has secondary education 0.294  0.712  0.511  1.406 
Husband's characteristics
   ln( parents' land + 1) 0.085  2.867  0.062  2.323 
   Primary education 0.148  0.979  0.381  2.801 
   Secondary education -0.060  -0.322  -0.142  -0.853 
   University education 0.434  1.571  0.556  2.328 
   Age 0.048  1.117  0.094  1.822 
   Age squared -0.001  -1.406  -0.001  -2.258 
   Year of marriage -0.018  -1.216  -0.040  -3.028 
Site dummies
   Saturia 0.455  3.219  0.583  4.601 
   Jessore -0.075  -0.516  0.098  0.756 
   Constant 36.696  1.229  85.052  3.180 
Number of observations 714  714 
F 14.89 
p-value 0 
R-squared 0.3112  0.1849 
Note: t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.42
Table 7—Determinants of husband's current assets
                  Dependent variables in natural logarithms of (assets+1)
Total value of husband's current assets
OLS Median
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Husband's characteristics
   Primary education 0.395  1.415  0.170  1.201 
   Secondary education 0.397  1.129  0.419  2.351 
   University education 0.122  0.215  0.270  0.966 
   Age 0.114  1.146  0.085  1.695 
   Age squared -0.001  -0.764  -0.001  -1.268 
   Birth order 0.270  4.391  0.088  2.841 
   Number of siblings -0.185  -2.879  -0.061  -1.876 
   Number of living brothers 0.001  0.014  -0.044  -0.878 
   ln(assets at marriage+1) 0.015  0.464  -0.024  -1.413 
Husband's parents' characteristics
   ln(parents' land +1) 0.291  4.957  0.243  8.099 
   Father has primary education 0.018  0.060  0.200  1.336 
   Father has secondary education 0.540  1.325  0.114  0.552 
   Mother illiterate 0.355  1.372  0.912  1.796 
Wife's characteristics
   ln( parents' land+1) 0.060  0.902  0.122  3.645 
   Primary education 0.265  0.872  0.206  1.346 
   Secondary education -0.980  -2.324  -0.406  -1.891 
   Age 0.124  1.220  0.044  0.858 
   Age squared -0.002  -1.621  -0.001  -1.009 
   Year of marriage -0.016  -1.143  -0.054  -1.950 
Site dummies
   Saturia 0.088  0.322  -0.187  -1.350 
   Jessore -1.038  -3.796  -0.642  -4.612 
   Constant 37.977  1.344  109.119  1.960 
Number of observations 719  719 
F 11.52 
p-value 0 
R-squared 0.2577  0.2003 
Note: t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.43
Table  8—Determinants of wife's current assets 
                     Dependent variables in natural logarithms of (assets+1)
Total value of wife's current assets
OLS Median
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Wife's characteristics
   Primary education 0.316  1.415  0.211  1.026 
   Secondary education -0.033  -0.107  0.082  0.287 
   Age 0.119  1.523  1.673  0.113 
   Age squared -0.001  -1.352  -0.001  -1.544 
   Birth order -0.016  -0.383  0.022  0.585 
   Number of siblings -0.003  -0.071  -0.054  -1.363 
   Number of living brothers 0.136  2.181  0.140  2.444 
   ln(assets at marriage + 1) -0.013  -0.243  0.017  0.362 
Wife's parents' characteristics
   ln(parents' land + 1) 0.059  1.33  0.142  2.917 
   Father has primary education -0.057  -0.257  -0.086  -0.434 
   Father has secondary education 0.033  0.120  0.286  1.157 
   Mother has primary education 0.199  0.694  0.049  0.186 
   Mother has secondary education 0.178  0.310  -0.048  -0.091 
Husband's characteristics
   ln( parents' land + 1) 0.050  1.219  0.020  0.531 
   Primary education -0.102  -0.482  0.160  0.829 
   Secondary education 0.695  2.694  0.561  2.380 
   University education 0.559  1.455  0.837  2.407 
   Age -0.056  -0.781  -0.067  -1.103 
   Age squared 0.000  0.692  0.001  0.931 
   Year of marriage -0.001  -0.034  -0.007  -0.364 
Site dummies
   Saturia 1.012  5.102  0.697  3.874 
   Jessore 0.464  2.300  0.510  2.782 
   Constant 5.310  0.128  18.462  0.493 
Number of observations 712  712 
F 4.7 
p-value 0 
R-squared 0.1304  0.0797 
Note:  t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.444
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Table 9—Expenditure shares as a function of assets at marriage, 2SLS estimates
   Food Housing Men's clothing Women's clothing Children's clothing Services
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
   Ln per capita expenditure  34.240  1.160  -28.138  -1.194  4.856  0.956  -0.835  -0.151  1.765  0.462  3.133  0.677 
   Ln per capita expenditure squared -3.750  -1.616  2.485  1.341  -0.310  -0.775  0.083  0.190  -0.107  -0.357  -0.161  -0.444 
   Ln household size -2.835  -2.673  0.385  0.454  0.523  2.865  0.049  0.244  -0.088  -0.642  0.643  3.867 
   Ln (hus  assets +1) 0.421  1.287  -0.382  -1.465  -0.024  -0.424  0.100  1.632  0.029  0.675  -0.049  -0.962 
   Ln (wife's assets +1) -0.001  -0.002  0.060  0.157  -0.041  -0.497  -0.075  -0.837  0.154  2.504  -0.130  -1.739 
Household demographics
   Share females 20-65 -8.067  -1.688  6.375  1.670  -2.834  -3.444  4.028  4.497  0.084  0.136  -0.963  -1.285 
   Share males 10-19 -5.015  -1.377  3.275  1.126  -1.019  -1.625  -0.525  -0.769  1.698  3.601  -0.778  -1.364 
   Share females 10-19 -4.808  -1.189  3.907  1.210  -3.321  -4.772  1.431  1.889  3.006  5.740  -0.637  -1.005 
   Share males 6-9 -3.642  -0.828  8.627  2.455  -4.248  -5.610  0.043  0.052  2.458  4.313  -0.355  -0.514 
   Share females 6-9 -3.046  -0.667  3.119  0.856  -3.734  -4.753  0.623  0.728  3.110  5.260  1.374  1.921 
   Share males 0-5 0.039  0.009  1.308  0.388  -2.115  -2.908  1.635  2.065  2.592  4.735  -0.501  -0.757 
   Share females 0-5 -8.930  -2.052  5.635  1.622  -1.100  -1.468  2.788  3.419  2.885  5.119  -0.511  -0.750 
   Share males 65+ -6.190  -0.805  1.507  0.246  -0.725  -0.548  -0.422  -0.293  2.992  3.006  0.090  0.075 
   Share females 65+ -0.865  -0.120  5.354  0.928  -3.309  -2.662  0.832  0.615  -0.289  -0.309  -1.263  -1.116 
Site and round dummies
   Saturia -3.653  -4.624  2.769  4.390  -0.592  -4.357  0.089  0.598  0.422  4.126  -0.515  -4.163 
   Jessore 3.476  3.605  0.712  0.925  -0.752  -4.535  -0.082  -0.454  0.299  2.391  -1.004  -6.648 
   Round 3 1.265  1.567  1.519  2.358  0.438  3.154  0.343  2.266  0.608  5.819  -0.108  -0.857 
   Round 4 1.055  1.357  1.547  2.490  0.219  1.638  0.307  2.103  0.171  1.698  0.070  0.572 
   Constant 7.640  0.082  78.637  1.054  -13.998  -0.871  2.846  0.163  -8.631  -0.713  -11.417  -0.780 
   Overidentification test (chi-square) 54.720  36.198  40.308  42.764  33.884  36.710 
   p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1920 
F 13.68  3.87  10.67  5.21  11.23  7.14 
p-value 0  0  0  0  0  0 
R-squared 0.236  0.140  0.0525  0.0084  0.0619  0.0125 
(continued)
Notes: Assets at marriage in 1996 taka; regressions on rounds 2, 3, and 4.  t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.  Instruments:  Round 1 values: ln per capita expenditure, ln per capita
expenditure squared, ln household size; for both husband and wife:  dummies for schooling (primary, secondary, university (husband only), age and age squared, birth order, family background:
father's schooling, mother's schooling or literacy, parent's land, number of siblings, number of living brothers, year of marriage (see Tables 5-8).4
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Table 9—(continued) 
Durables Health Celebrations Education Personal care Nondurables
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
   Ln per capita expenditure  1.635  0.731  -21.838  -1.701  -9.649  -0.531  8.677  1.043  5.509  1.277  1.042  0.607 
   Ln per capita expenditure squared -0.125  -0.709  1.852  1.835  0.766  0.536  -0.420  -0.642  -0.433  -1.277  -0.095  -0.703 
   Ln household size -0.292  -3.627  0.512  1.109  2.039  3.122  0.573  1.919  -0.182  -1.175  -0.226  -3.659 
   Ln (hus  assets + 1) -0.009  -0.358  0.182  1.283  0.137  0.678  -0.037  -0.406  -0.010  -0.219  0.020  1.036 
   Ln (wife's assets + 1) -0.004  -0.107  -0.337  -1.626  -0.000  0.000  0.339  2.526  -0.054  -0.783  0.006  0.219 
Household demographics
   Share females 20-65 -0.189  -0.523  -1.091  -0.525  2.570  0.873  -2.075  -1.541  0.338  0.484  0.300  1.077 
   Share males 10-19 -0.185  -0.669  -0.761  -0.481  -0.420  -0.187  4.086  3.982  -0.319  -0.600  0.278  1.312 
   Share females 10-19 0.037  0.122  -0.296  -0.168  -2.887  -1.159  2.515  2.207  1.194  2.021  0.443  1.884 
   Share males 6-9 0.025  0.075  0.821  0.429  -2.887  -1.065  1.415  1.141  -0.513  -0.798  0.081  0.316 
   Share females 6-9 0.010  0.028  0.030  0.015  -0.869  -0.309  0.067  0.052  -0.208  -0.312  0.324  1.219 
   Share males 0-5 0.023  0.071  1.460  0.794  -5.217  -2.005  0.939  0.788  0.116  0.188  0.142  0.576 
   Share females 0-5 0.514  1.559  1.439  0.760  -6.130  -2.288  0.822  0.670  0.439  0.690  0.468  1.848 
   Share males 65+ -0.761  -1.307  0.769  0.230  -2.302  -0.486  8.097  3.740  -0.576  -0.513  0.092  0.207 
   Share females 65+ -0.698  -1.275  -8.098  -2.579  4.344  0.977  1.800  0.885  -1.257  -1.191  0.549  1.305 
Site and round dummies
   Saturia 0.098  1.640  -0.683  -1.987  0.599  1.231  0.871  3.912  0.730  6.324  0.022  0.473 
   Jessore -0.151  -2.066  0.396  0.945  0.285  0.480  -0.170  -0.626  -0.165  -1.173  0.116  2.070 
   Round 3 0.035  0.580  -1.813  -5.166  0.104  0.210  -0.584  -2.568  0.147  1.249  -0.007  -0.145 
   Round 4 0.015  0.255  -1.230  -3.635  0.186  0.389  -0.758  -3.460  0.130  1.140  -0.069  -1.516 
   Constant -4.080  -0.576  68.628  1.689  28.170  0.490  -39.511  -1.501  -14.606  -1.070  -2.081  -0.383 
   Overidentification test (chi-square) 40.618  37.711  30.055  45.743  63.877  26.543 
   p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1920 
F 2.92  2.56  1.94  17.03  5.22  2.1 
p-value 0  0  0.0101  0  0  0.0043 




Transport Recreation Fuel Cigarettes
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
    Ln per capita expenditure  -1.409  -0.141  -4.090  -3.221  7.107  1.036  4.816  0.997 
    Ln per capita expenditure squared 0.323  0.412  0.333  3.338  -0.580  -1.074  -0.442  -1.163 
    Ln household size -0.179  -0.498  0.015  0.328  -0.703  -2.851  -0.540  -3.110 
    Ln (hus  assets +1) -0.093  -0.846  0.003  0.246  -0.178  -2.339  0.073  1.356 
    Ln (wife's assets +1) 0.078  0.488  -0.051  -2.481  -0.062  -0.561  -0.061  -0.787 
Household demographics
    Share females 20-65 -0.709  -0.440  0.126  0.612  0.432  0.389  -0.096  -0.122 
    Share males 10-19 0.462  0.376  -0.108  -0.691  0.585  0.691  -0.765  -1.282 
    Share females 10-19 0.526  0.385  -0.103  -0.590  0.803  0.854  -0.616  -0.931 
    Share males 6-9 -1.051  -0.707  -0.149  -0.786  0.693  0.678  -1.039  -1.442 
    Share females 6-9 0.707  0.459  -0.127  -0.649  -0.169  -0.159  -0.874  -1.170 
    Share males 0-5 1.957  1.371  -0.136  -0.748  0.252  0.257  -2.161  -3.123 
    Share females 0-5 4.568  3.110  0.110  0.589  -0.066  -0.065  -1.554  -2.181 
    Share males 65+ 1.448  0.558  -0.787  -2.382  0.675  0.377  -3.147  -2.501 
    Share females 65+ 5.465  2.242  -0.367  -1.182  -0.848  -0.505  -1.571  -1.329 
Site and round dummies
    Saturia -0.994  -3.726  0.075  2.203  0.803  4.370  0.354  2.737 
    Jessore -1.646  -5.058  0.006  0.156  -0.410  -1.829  -0.269  -1.704 
    Round 3 -0.767  -2.814  -0.064  -1.830  -0.215  -1.147  -0.327  -2.476 
    Round 4 -0.991  -3.773  -0.014  -0.431  -0.384  -2.123  -0.323  -2.534 
    Constant 0.051  0.002  12.981  3.229  -16.608  -0.765  -8.310  -0.543 
    Overidentification test (chi-square) 61.906  37.532  39.383  70.763 
    p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 
F 6.17  3.04  3.18  5.58 
p-value 0  0  0  0 
R-squared . . 0.0007  0.0823 
Tests for excluded instruments (F-test):
   Ln per capita expenditure 22.58 
   Ln per capita expenditure squared 21.02 
   Ln household size 213.54 
   Ln husband's assets at marriage 7.47 
   Ln wife's assets at marriage 22.27 4
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Table 10—Expenditure shares as a function of current assets, 2SLS estimates
Food Housing Men's clothing Women's clothing Children's clothing Services
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
    Ln per capita expenditure  26.142  0.841  -14.582  -0.598  6.397  1.194  1.118  0.195  -1.744  -0.429  6.853  1.370 
    Ln pce -3.068  -1.288  1.772  0.949  -0.452  -1.102  -0.079  -0.181  0.123  0.397  -0.408  -1.065 
squared
    Ln household size -2.808  -2.319  1.409  1.483  0.464  2.225  0.002  0.011  -0.158  -0.999  0.729  3.741 
    Ln (hus  assets +1) 0.781  2.842  -0.335  -1.554  -0.134  -2.828  -0.085  -1.689  0.042  1.160  -0.079  -1.782 
    Ln (wife's assets +1) -0.894  -0.911  -1.392  -1.807  0.213  1.259  0.133  0.737  0.266  2.074  -0.224  -1.416 
Household demographics
    Share females 20-65 -6.049  -1.239  5.433  1.418  -3.242  -3.853  3.651  4.062  0.402  0.630  -1.349  -1.717 
    Share males 10-19 -5.807  -1.315  7.944  2.293  -1.128  -1.482  -0.762  -0.937  1.203  2.084  -0.201  -0.283 
    Share females 10-19 -5.203  -1.150  7.671  2.161  -3.463  -4.442  1.213  1.457  2.684  4.540  -0.248  -0.340 
    Share males 6-9 -1.381  -0.259  12.797  3.055  -4.807  -5.224  -0.258  -0.262  1.766  2.532  0.246  0.287 
    Share females 6-9 -4.333  -0.852  8.131  2.038  -3.831  -4.371  0.242  0.259  2.693  4.053  1.910  2.335 
    Share males 0-5 2.157  0.413  5.827  1.423  -2.699  -3.000  1.229  1.278  1.924  2.820  0.093  0.110 
    Share females 0-5 -6.878  -1.143  12.288  2.603  -1.785  -1.721  2.204  1.989  1.871  2.379  0.433  0.448 
    Share males 65+ -7.529  -0.913  8.841  1.365  -0.507  -0.357  -0.105  -0.069  0.583  0.540  2.387  1.798 
    Share females 65+ 0.780  0.109  6.689  1.193  -3.456  -2.804  1.067  0.811  -1.264  -1.353  -0.467  -0.406 
Site and round dummies
    Saturia -2.717  -2.386  3.759  4.206  -0.783  -3.987  0.028  0.133  0.242  1.625  -0.375  -2.046 
    Jessore 4.212  4.358  1.628  2.146  -0.982  -5.895  -0.414  -2.326  0.130  1.031  -0.876  -5.632 
    Round 1.174  1.168  0.613  0.776  0.487  2.812  0.360  1.943  0.725  5.517  -0.229  -1.414 
3
    Round 0.973  1.105  0.942  1.363  0.256  1.687  0.319  1.968  0.249  2.161  -0.009  -0.066 
4
   31.885  0.320  27.560  0.353  -18.154  -1.058  -2.269  -0.124  4.018  0.309  -24.640  -1.538 
Constant
    Overidentification test (chi-square) 44.332. 34.136  27.742  41.929  35.292  34.352 
    p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920  1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
F 13.85  4.05  11.01  5.34  10.60  6.58 
p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R-squared 0.218  0.149  0.026  0.019  0.021 
(continued)
Notes:  Current assets in 1996 taka; regressions on rounds 2, 3, and 4.   t-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.  Instruments:  Round 1 values: ln per capita expenditure, ln per capita
expenditure squared, ln household size; for both husband and wife: dummies for schooling (primary, secondary, university (husband only), age and age squared, birth order, family background: 
father's schooling, mother's schooling or literacy, parent's land, number of siblings, number of living brothers, year of marriage (see Tables 5-8).4
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Table 10—(continued)
Durables Health Celebrations Education Personal care Nondurables
Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
    Ln per capita expenditure  2.548  1.083  -21.755  -1.659  -14.539  -0.753  1.996  0.224  8.094  1.755  1.257  0.702 
    Ln pce  squared -0.190  -1.057  1.743  1.735  1.043  0.705  -0.018  -0.027  -0.635  -1.799  -0.110  -0.801 
    Ln household size -0.271  -2.957  0.097  0.189  1.728  2.299  0.371  1.071  -0.185  -1.030  -0.218  -3.129 
    Ln (hus  assets +1) -0.053  -2.531  0.068  0.583  0.148  0.865  -0.059  -0.746  -0.148  -3.639  -0.013  -0.815 
    Ln (wife's assets +1) 0.024  0.324  0.278  0.672  0.393  0.645  0.823  2.928  0.124  0.853  0.018  0.315 
Household demographics
    Share females 20-65   -0.345  -0.935  -1.314  -0.638  3.000  0.990  -1.747  -1.250  -0.149  -0.206  0.259  0.921 
    Share males 10-19 -0.070  -0.209  -2.348  -1.261  -1.902  -0.694  3.012  2.383  -0.213  -0.325  0.274  1.079 
    Share females 10-19 0.120  0.350  -1.724  -0.903  -4.060  -1.446  1.762  1.361  1.227  1.829  0.448  1.719 
    Share males 6-9 -0.009  -0.023  -0.170  -0.076  -4.078  -1.231  -0.748  -0.490  -0.797  -1.007  0.058  0.188 
    Share females 6-9 0.132  0.344  -1.929  -0.900  -2.467  -0.782  -0.713  -0.490  -0.117  -0.156  0.304  1.037 
    Share males 0-5 -0.013  -0.032  0.208  0.095  -6.514  -2.010  -1.137  -0.761  -0.202  -0.260  0.107  0.355 
    Share females 0-5 0.502  1.103  -0.346  -0.136  -8.100  -2.168  -2.055  -1.193  0.113  0.127  0.404  1.166 
    Share males 65+ -0.534  -0.854  1.474  0.423  -4.820  -0.941  2.840  1.202  0.139  0.113  0.017  0.035 
    Share females 65+ -0.720  -1.331  -6.931  -2.299  3.924  0.884  -0.771  -0.377  -1.206  -1.137  0.522  1.268 
Site and round dummies
    Saturia 0.076  0.887  -0.883  -1.838  0.335  0.474  0.227  0.698  0.621  3.676  0.021  0.316 
    Jessore -0.215  -2.938  0.111  0.273  0.042  0.070  -0.681  -2.463  -0.388  -2.709  0.055  0.988 
    Round 3 0.018  0.237  -1.554  -3.664  0.382  0.612  -0.268  -0.931  0.140  0.936  -0.012  -0.211 
    Round 4 0.004  0.066  -1.056  -2.842  0.371  0.678  -0.544  -2.157  0.128  0.977  -0.072  -1.425 
    Constant -6.922  -0.919  70.150  1.670  46.147  0.746  -14.536  -0.510  -22.388  -1.515  -2.556  -0.446 
   Overidentification test (chi-square) 32.543  36.959  28.351  38.542  44.747  26.815 
    p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
F 3.26  2.49  1.89  16.36  5.8  2.08 
p-value 0.000  0.001  0.013  0.000  0.000  0.005 




Transport Recreation Fuel Cigarettes
Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic Co-efficient t-statistic
Endogenous regressors
    Ln per capita expenditure -6.235  -0.600  -3.448  -2.682  10.583  1.412  4.990  0.996 
    Ln pce squared 0.565  0.709  0.279  2.831  -0.758  -1.320  -0.479  -1.248 
    Ln household size -0.513  -1.266  -0.013  -0.263  -0.458  -1.569  -0.628  -3.219 
    Ln (hus  assets +1) -0.028  -0.305  -0.015  -1.351  -0.028  -0.421  -0.002  -0.047 
    Ln (wife's assets +1) 0.670  2.040  0.007  0.168  -0.525  -2.219  0.105  0.661 
Household demographics
    Share females 20-65 -0.564  -0.345  0.023  0.112  0.301  0.256  -0.194  -0.246 
    Share males 10-19 -0.775  -0.525  -0.166  -0.910  1.906  1.790  -1.161  -1.632 
    Share females 10-19 -0.508  -0.336  -0.178  -0.952  1.816  1.666  -0.956  -1.311 
    Share males 6-9 -3.016  -1.689  -0.189  -0.858  2.096  1.629  -1.337  -1.555 
    Share females 6-9 -0.339  -0.200  -0.219  -1.041  1.269  1.036  -1.377  -1.681 
    Share males 0-5 0.024  0.014  -0.200  -0.926  1.780  1.415  -2.537  -3.016 
    Share females 0-5 2.033  1.010  0.048  0.191  2.225  1.534  -2.113  -2.180 
    Share males 65+ -1.413  -0.512  -0.371  -1.088  3.584  1.802  -3.213  -2.417 
    Share females 65+ 4.101  1.715  -0.165  -0.559  -0.049  -0.028  -1.389  -1.206 
Site and round dummies
    Saturia -1.596  -4.190  0.062  1.323  1.130  4.117  0.297  1.617 
    Jessore -1.880  -5.812  -0.010  -0.255  0.142  0.609  -0.435  -2.792 
    Round 3 -0.418  -1.242  -0.054  -1.306  -0.458  -1.889  -0.270  -1.664 
    Round 4 -0.753  -2.554  -0.008  -0.211  -0.546  -2.572  -0.284  -2.002 
    Constant 17.775  0.534  10.923  2.652  -31.025  -1.292  -8.068  -0.503 
    Overidentification test 57.454  44.221  36.962  72.936 
    p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Number of observations 1,920 1,920 1,920 1,920
F 6.35  2.96  2.82  5.53 
p-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R-squared . . . 0.089 
Tests for excluded instruments (F-test):
    Ln per capita expenditure 22.58 
    Ln per capita expenditure squared 21.02 
    Ln household size 213.54 
    Ln husband's current assets 18.96 
    Ln  wife's current assets  10.54 5
1
Table 11—Expenditure shares on food:  animal products, plant products, and cereals, 2SLS estimates
Assets at marriage as regressors Current assets as regressors
Animal products cereals) Cereals Animal products cereals) Cereals
Plant products (ex Plant products (ex
Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
Endogenous regressors
  Ln per capita expenditure  -11.198  -1.308  0.398  1.468  -0.142  -0.465  -11.203  -1.253  0.387  1.369  -0.192  -0.598 
  Ln per capita expenditure squared 0.841  1.248  -0.026  -1.211  -0.002  -0.087  0.859  1.254  -0.027  -1.237  0.004  0.147 
  Ln household size 3.301  10.726  -0.013  -1.375  0.004  0.321  3.421  9.824  -0.018  -1.659  0.007  0.527 
  Ln (husband's assets + 1) 0.057  0.596  -0.001  -0.173  -0.003  -0.829  -0.095  -1.201  -0.003  -1.159  0.009  3.212 
  Ln (wife's assets + 1) 0.181  1.309  -0.001  -0.132  -0.002  -0.503  0.158  0.559  0.011  1.246  -0.021  -2.069 
Household demographics
  Share females 20-65 -1.013  -0.730  0.104  2.376  -0.064  -1.284  -1.112  -0.792  0.097  2.181  -0.040  -0.790 
  Share males 10-19 -2.666  -2.523  -0.024  -0.718  0.082  2.185  -2.447  -1.927  -0.041  -1.016  0.099  2.164 
  Share females 10-19 -2.180  -1.858  0.060  1.604  -0.089  -2.121  -1.904  -1.463  0.045  1.084  -0.076  -1.614 
  Share males 6-9 -2.576  -2.018  0.090  2.217  -0.046  -1.016  -2.789  -1.817  0.059  1.206  0.004  0.073 
  Share females 6-9 -0.947  -0.715  0.046  1.108  -0.087  -1.837  -0.674  -0.461  0.031  0.663  -0.070  -1.331 
  Share males 0-5 -0.235  -0.192  -0.036  -0.934  -0.063  -1.436  -0.431  -0.287  -0.068  -1.439  -0.010  -0.177 
  Share females 0-5 -1.416  -1.121  0.065  1.630  -0.132  -2.937  -1.765  -1.020  0.024  0.438  -0.061  -0.975 
  Share males 65+ 0.667  0.299  0.061  0.868  -0.208  -2.622  -0.836  -0.352  0.039  0.515  -0.153  -1.795 
  Share females 65+ -0.266  -0.127  -0.020  -0.307  0.029  0.383  -1.149  -0.559  -0.034  -0.523  0.064  0.868 
Site and round dummies
  Saturia -0.874  -3.814  0.021  2.834  0.059  7.185  -0.929  -2.837  0.011  1.064  0.074  6.240 
  Jessore 0.082  0.293  0.047  5.258  -0.009  -0.869  -0.263  -0.947  0.038  4.353  0.019  1.922 
  Round 3 -0.587  -2.506  0.013  1.775  0.030  3.570  -0.633  -2.190  0.018  1.938  0.026  2.466 
  Round 4 -0.391  -1.731  0.025  3.431  0.016  2.029  -0.422  -1.665  0.028  3.458  0.013  1.466 
  Constant 34.801  1.284  -1.181  -1.376  1.466  1.517  36.109  1.261  -1.102  -1.217  1.514  1.470 
  Overidentification test (chi-square) 33.971  27.673  70.673  34.100  23.835  51.293 
  p-value 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Tests for excluded instruments (F-test):
  Ln per capita expenditure 22.54  22.54 
  Ln per capita expenditure squared 21.02  21.02 
  Ln household size 213.54  213.54 
  Ln husband's assets 7.47  18.96 
  Ln wife's assets  22.27  10.54 
Number of observations 1,920  1,920  1,920  1,920  1,920  1,920 
F 12.58  9.32  16.44  12.48  9.5  17.02 
p-value 0  0  0  0  0  0 
R-squared 0.101  0.043  0.054  0.095  0.040  0.031 
Notes:  t-statistics in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.  Instruments:  Round 1 values: ln per capita expenditure, ln per capita expenditure squared, ln household size; for both husband and wife:
dummies for schooling (primary, secondary, university (husband only), age and age squared, birth order, family background:  father's schooling, mother's schooling or literacy, parent's land, number
of siblings, number of living brothers, year of marriage (see Tables 5-8).52
Table 12—Summary of coefficients on alternative measures of men's and women's
assets
Men's Women's Children's
Food Housing clothing clothing clothing Services Durables Health
OLS:  Assets at marriage
  Husband -0.035  0.089  -0.017  -0.018  0.001  -0.040  0.031  0.012 
  Wife 0.147  0.020  0.011  -0.023  -0.341  0.046  0.091  0.039 
OLS:  Current assets
  Husband 0.049  0.007  0.017  0.021  0.003  0.059  -0.200  0.020 
  Wife -0.032  0.034  0.010  0.024  0.003  -0.067  -0.293  0.039 
2SLS:  Assets at marriage
  Husband 0.421  -0.382  -0.024  0.100  0.029  -0.049  -0.009  0.182 
  Wife -0.001  0.060  -0.041  -0.075  -0.004  0.154  -0.130  -0.337 
2SLS:  Current assets (a)
  Husband -0.236  0.040  0.010  0.767  -0.147  -0.098  -0.073  -0.052 
  Wife -0.974  -0.572  0.090  0.019  -0.151  0.036  -0.185  0.238 
2SLS: Current assets (b)
  Husband -0.335  0.042  0.068  0.781  -0.134  -0.085  -0.079  -0.053 
  Wife -0.894  0.213  0.133  -0.224  0.024  0.278  -1.392  0.266 
Personal  Non-
Celebrations Education care durables Transport Recreation Fuel Cigarettes
OLS:  Assets at marriage
  Husband -0.026  -0.001  -0.000  0.002  -0.003  -0.021  0.000  0.022 
  Wife 0.024  0.048  -0.008  0.058  0.036  -0.259  0.171  0.027 
OLS:  Current assets
  Husband -0.050  -0.009  0.012  0.001  -0.001  0.003  0.020  0.013 
  Wife -0.002  -0.013  -0.138  0.169  0.053  0.013  0.134  0.047 
2SLS:  Assets at marriage
  Husband 0.137  -0.037  -0.010  0.020  -0.093  0.003  0.073  -0.178 
  Wife -0.000  -0.054  0.006  0.078  -0.062  -0.061  0.339  -0.051 
2SLS:  Current assets (a)
  Husband 0.159  -0.075  -0.015  -0.042  -0.017  -0.030  -0.003  -0.141 
  Wife 0.417  0.193  -0.003  -0.005  0.095  0.707  0.554  -0.550 
2SLS: Current assets (b)
  Husband 0.148  -0.059  -0.013  -0.028  -0.015  -0.028  -0.002  -0.148 
  Wife 0.393  0.124  0.018  0.007  0.105  0.823  0.670  -0.525 
Notes:  Coefficients in bold are significant at 10 percent or better.  Instruments include assets at marriage of husband
and wife; see Table 9 for other instruments.54
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Table 13—Distribution of durable goods and equipment by owners (851 couples) in
percent of households or individuals who own the goods
                              Owners                               
Category of assets Husband Wife Joint Others Household
(percent)
Irrigation equipment 11 0 17 16 37
Agricultural equipment 30 0 34 1 55
Transportation 22 1 15 9 42
Bicycle 17 0 12 8 33
Cottage industry 1 1 2 0 4
Household durables 26 15 94 17 99
Radio 11 1 14 8 31
Jewelry 1 70 6 17 81
Fish net 12 0 18 2 28
Large tree 23 0 29 2 48
Others 21 1 29 2 45
Source: IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 survey.
Notes: Irrigation equipment includes (shares of) DTW, LLP, HTW. Agricultural equipment includes
plough, hand saw, power tiller, thresher, other agricultural equipment. Transportation includes
bicycle, rickshaw/van, boat, motorcycle, pushcart. Cottage industry includes sewing machine, rice
mills. Household durables include metal cooking utensils, clock, radio, TV.
Table 14—Distribution of animal ownership, by site (792 couples with animals)
                                                    Owners                                             
         Saturia               Mymensingh            Jessore         
Category of animals Husband Wife Husband Wife Husband Wife
(percent)
Poultry 3 72 1 80 2 88
Sheep, goats 5 22 6 7 3 33
Young cattle 38 9 37 1 17 5
Milk cows 12 2 18 1 11 0
Bullocks 25 4 13 0 13 7
Source: IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1996 survey.5759
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